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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. E. WILLIAMS, 
Plaintiff ,and Appellant, 
vs. 
H. R. ESPEY, 
and 
J. H. MORGAN, SR. 
Defendant, Case No. 9251 
Defendant and 
Cross-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND 
CROSS-AP'PELLANT, J. H. MORGAN, SR. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
To aid the Court the respondent and cross-ap-
pellant Morgan will likewise refer to the transcript 
by the letter "R' and to the parties as in the court 
below. 
This brief will encompass both an answer to 
appellant's brief and the cross appeal of the de-
fendant Morgan. As to each subject a statement 
of points will be separately set forth. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In most respects the plaintiff's statement of 
facts is acceptable to the defendant Morgan. There 
are some material statements made, however, that 
are not supported by the testimony and exhibits, 
and in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced 
at the trial. Also, additional facts are necessary to 
properly present the picture to this court. 
The defendant Morgan especially objects to the 
factual statement at page 3 of plaintiff's brief 
wherein it is stated: 
"However, when plaintiff pointed out 
the options contained in the agreement and 
attempted to exercise the option to purchase 
the additional 2500 shares of White Canyon 
Mining Company stock at 80 cents per share, 
the defendant Morgan refused to make any 
payment and indicated to plaintiff that the 
agreement in his opinion was usurious and 
plaintiff left Morgan's office without any 
satisfaction either by \vay of cash or stock. 
(R. 47-49)" 
The above referred to pag·es do not support 
such a factual statement. The record is clear that 
defendant Morgan offered to pay the note (R. 48. 
R. 69-70. R. 79. R. 83. R. 120-121.) Morgan paid 
into court $2,681.55 on November 4, 1955. (R. 14.) 
The quoted statement fron1 plaintiff's brief 
is also misleading, unfounded, a11d contrary to the 
facts which are that at the time the plai11tiff can1e 
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to see the defendant Morgan, purportedly to exer-
cise the option for 2500 shares of White Canyon 
Mining Company stock, the plaintiff was actually 
asking for 10,000 shares of White Canyon Mining 
Company stock and not just the 2500 shares as 
set forth in plaintiff's statement of facts. The facts 
are that plaintiff was demanding the 7500 shares 
in addition to the 2500 shares. (R. 66-67. R. 78. R. 
84. R. 95. R. 120-121.) As testified to by plaintiff 
( R. 51. ) , plain tiff's counsel was authorized to write 
and did send to defendant's Ex. P-5, from which 
we quote: 
"Demand is hereby made upon you for 
delivery of 7500 shares of White Canyon Min-
ing Company stock in lieu of payment of the 
above mentioned note and further demand is 
hereby made for an additional 2500 shares 
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at 
the purchase price of 80¢ per share, totaling 
$2000, which amount I am authorized to pay 
you upon recr.ipt of 10,000 shares of said 
stock.'' 
Morgan's testimony is completely consonant 
with the contents of Ex. P-5 which, as above noted, 
was written and sent by plaintiff's counsel. Morgan 
testified: 
"The conversation took place as Mr. Wil-
liams stated after I told him that I would pay 
the $2500.00 note and interest and then he 
said, 'What about the stock?' We had the 
contract out at that time and he said he want-
ed the 7500 shares and the 2500 shares. The 
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2500 shares he was willing to pay the eighty 
cents a share if I would deliver him the 10,000 
shares. He put it just about the same way as 
Mr. Boyle put it in his letter; that they ~anted 
delivery of the 10,000 shares. I told h1m that 
I was holding that stock as trustee for Mr. 
Espey; that if I should deliver him the 7500 
shares, Mr. Espey could sue me because I 
was holding it in trust for him; that the only 
thing I could do was to let him exercise his 
option if he wanted to on the 2500 shares at 
eighty cents. He didn't want to exercise his 
option on the 2500 shares unless I would de-
liver him the full 10,000 shares. (R. 95.) 
Moreover, plaintiff was willing to loan defen-
dant Espey money upon proper safeguards, for he 
testified: 
''If you could get someone whom I know 
or know of and know that they are good for 
it, I \vould possibly make the loan." (R. 43.) 
Additionally, it is a fact that the defendant 
Morgan had never met the plaintiff until some four 
to ten days after the note had becon1e due. (R. 47. 
R. 55. R. 58.) The defendant Morgan 'vas an ac-
comnlodation endorser and did 11ot receive any por-
tion of the $2,500.00 loaned by the plaintiff to the 
defendant Espey. (R. 67. R.118). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POI~T I. 
TI-IERE IS NO ERROR IN THE FIXl)JNG OF THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT TI-IE 7500 SHARES OF ''THITE 
CANYON STOCI{ WERE HELD BY THE DEFENDANT 
MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY. 
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POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE 7'500 SHARES OF STOCK WERE 
NOT HELD AS SECURITY, PLAINTIFF MUST NEVER-
THELESS FAIL UNDER HIS THEORY, SINCE MOR-
GAN ELECTED TO PAY THE NOTE RATHER THAN 
DELIVER THE SHARES. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THERE IS NO ERROR IN THE FINDING OF THE 
TRIAL COURT THAT THE 7500 SHARES OF WHITE 
CANYON STOCK WERE HELD BY THE DEFENDANT 
MORGAN AS SECURITY ONLY. 
Plaintiff contends by his appeal that he can 
parlay a loan of $2,500.00 for five months into 
$16,780.00, and this amount to be charged to a de-
fendant (Morgan) who did not receive five cents 
of the $2,500.00 loaned by plaintiff. Assuming the 
facts and law would support such a harvest, it is 
shocking. Fortunately, neither the facts nor the law 
will permit it. 
Plaintiff in his brief asumes that the 7500 
shares was a pledge and then proceeds to say it 
was not a pledge because possession was never de-
livered to plaintiff. The defendant Morgan is not 
overly concerned as to what type of security the 
7500 shares constituted. Possibly the shares did 
constitute a pledge~ If so, did not the plaintiff and 
all parties select and agree that Morgan would be 
the pledge holder? How more clearly could they have 
done this than by their execution of the agreement, 
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Ex. P-1. The law is cognizant of such a delivery 
to a depository or pledge holder. See 41 Am. Jur. 
599, wherein it is stated: 
"In order to perfect the contract of 
pledge, the delivery need not be made !o the 
creditor himself; it will be sufficient 1f the 
thing pledged is placed in the hands of a third 
person who l1as been chosen by debtor and 
creditor to hold for the creditor, provided 
such third person kno,vs of the trust and ac-
cepts the obligation which it imposes." 
See also C.J.S. at page 23 wherein it is stated: 
"Such third person may be agent, clerk 
or servant of the pledgeor." 
The fundamental and basic question is whether 
or not the 7500 shares were held as security. They 
n1ay have taken the form of a chattel mortgage, a 
bailment, trust, trust receipt, or it may have been 
that they were the subject of an equitable lien. In 
this regard, see generally 33 Am. Ju·r. 427, wherein 
it is stated: 
"An equitable lien is a right, not recog-
nized at law, to haYe a fund or specific pro-
perty, or its proceeds, applied in whole or 
in part to the payment of a particular debt 
or class of debts. It is 11ot an estate of pro-
perty in the t~ing· itself,_ noF i~ it a right to 
rec?ver the thing, tl~at Is, It Is not a right 
which may be the basis of a possessory action 
but it is merely a charge upon it. Such a lie~ 
may be created by an express contact which 
shows an intention to charge so1ne particular 
property with a debt or obligation, or it may 
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arise by implication from the relations and 
dealings of the parties whose interests are 
involved. Likewise, a lien may be created by 
an equitable assignment of a contract, debt, 
or fund. In fact, if a transaction resolves it-
self into a security, whatever may be its 
form and whatever name the parties may 
choose to give it, it is in equity a lien. Pos-
session by the lienor of the thing sought to be 
charged is not essential to the existence of 
an equitable lien, which differs in this respect 
from a common-law lien." 
C.J.S. defines equitable liens as follows, page 
836: 
"The essential elements of an Equitable 
Lien include a debt, duty or obligation owing 
by one person to another, and a res to which 
that obligation fastens. An Equitable Lien 
may arise from an express contract whereby a 
party promises to transfer, or indicates an 
intent to charge a particular property as 
security for an obligation. No special form 
of contract is essential, provided the intent of 
the parties to create a lien is clearly ex-
pressed.'' 
Utah recognizes the equitable lien doctrine. See 
Olsen vs. Kidman, 120 Utah 443, 2'35 P. 2d 510. 
To determine the status of the 7500 shares, 
the contract and note, Ex. P-1 and P-2, respectively, 
must be examined. The contract has in the recital 
paragraph that first parties (the defendants) are 
to receive 50,000 shares of White Canyon Mining 
Company stock; and second party (the plaintiff) 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
shall make a $2500.00 loan to defendant Espey. 
By paragraph 1, defendant Espey agrees to 
execute a note for $2500.00 plus interest for a period 
of five months. In this same paragraph the agree-
ment provides: 
"To secure said note, Espey authorizes 
Morgan to hold for him in trust 7500 shares 
... to be delivered to second party upon fail-
ure to pay the note when due." 
Then the agreement at paragraph 2 commences: 
"For making said loan, second party may 
choose one of three following options." 
The options are lettered "A" "B" and "C" 
' ' ' 
and the first two refer to Coyote claims and "C" 
grants an option to White Canyon stock. In addi-
tion to the above three options, the agreement states: 
"A11 additional consideration for said 
I '' oan ... 
And this relates to the particular 2500 shares of 
'Vhite Canyon Mining Company stock, which are 
partially the subject of this litigation and often-
times referred to as the option stock. 
It is to be r2adily noted that the agreement 
Yery clearly separates the 11ote and 7500 shares of 
stock contained in parag·raph 1 from the option 
stock which is contained in parag·rapl1 2. Observe 
that paragraph 2 con1n1ences: ''For n1aking said 
loan ... " and there is give11 under this paragraph 
the options lettered "A" "B" and "C" Th , , . ese op-
tions, in other words, were the consideration for 
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the making of the loan. Observe also that the ag·ree-
ment states, "An aditional consideration for said 
loan ... " and there it is just as the parties in-
tended, the plaintiff was granted the further option 
to acquire 2500 shares upon paying 80 cents per 
share. 
The 7500 shares of White Canyon stock are 
tied in solely and exclusively with the note and, in 
fact, the agreement states that they are "to secure 
said note." And so the agreement, under any reason-
able interpretation, shows an intent to separate 
the option stock from the security stock which was 
tied to the note. 
As an aid to the construction and interpreta-
tion we need not entirely be confined to the four 
corners of the agree1nent. Certainly the note, Ex. P-2, 
should be considered. The note is in the normal form 
and the last sentence provides: 
"If this note or interest is not paid as 
agreed, the undersigned jointly and severally 
agree to pay all costs incurred and such reas-
onable attorney's fees as may be allowed by 
court upon the actual foreclosure of the se-
curity or upon entry of judgment." 
Thus, the note clearly spells out what was to 
be done with the security if default occurred .. 
The agreement and note are plainly susceptible 
to only one reasonable interpretation. They clearly 
show that the parties understood the difference 
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between a security transaction and option for a 
sale. There are no provisions for forfeiture or liqui-
dated damages. 
Since there are no words of sale pertaining to 
the 7500 shares of stock qualifying the manifest pro-
Yisions that said shares are held as security, plain-
tiff's claim that he is entitled to all of it in absolute 
appropriation to satisfaction of the debt must be 
found in some rule of law. Plaintiff has quoted no 
such law, and our search has revealed no such rule. 
The cases are numerable holding that a creditor is 
entitled to satisfaction of the debt and he can look 
to the security for satisfaction, but that he would be 
required to account to the debtor for any surplus 
above the obligation and proper expenses, and upon 
payment or tender before sale of the security, the 
lie11 upon the security is discharged. Lilenquist v. 
l~tah State Savings Bank, 99 Utah 163, 100 P. 2d. 
185; Hyams v. Ba·mberger, 10 Utah 336 P. 2d 202. 
The Lilenquist case, supra, quotes with approval the 
text of R.C.L. found in 41 Am. Jur., Pledges and Col-
lateral Sec1trity, Sec. 7 4: 
"The rule is settled in 1nost jurisdictions 
that upon the tender of the an1ount of the debt 
for which the property is pledged, either upon 
the day of the n1aturity, or thereafter before 
the property has been lawfully sold by the 
pledgee, the lien of the pledgee is destroyed 
and an action will lie in favor of the pledgeor' 
against the pledgee if the I'atter refuses t~ 
10 
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deliver up the pledge, and it is usually held 
that it is not necessary that the pledgeor 
should keep the tender good in order to main-
tain the action." 
The plaintiff, in his efforts to avoid the ob-
viously correct finding of the trial court that the 
7500 shares were held as security for the note, has 
been forced to contend th'at in reality the option 
lay with the defendants as to whether they wolild 
pay the note at matu1·ity or deliver the stock. See 
page 12, plaintiff's brief. To support this strained 
contention, the plaintiff argues at page 13 of his 
brief; that it was his understanding that if the stock 
had gone down in value, the defendants could have 
satisfied their obligation insofar as the $2500.00 
loan was concerned by delivering 7500 shares of 
stock; that even though the stock might be worth 
less than $2500.00 at the time the note was due, 
still, plaintif was willing to take the gamble of such 
a transaction because of the hope that the stock 
would subsequently achieve a substantial increase 
in value. 
In making this argument, reliance is placed 
upon the testimony of the plaintiff as to what was 
his understanding of the agreement. The purported 
understanding was never communicated or divulged 
to defendant Morgan and, although repeated and 
strenuous objection was made to the admisison of 
this testimony during the course of the trial, never-
11 
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theless the evidence was admitted. In view of the 
court's finding, there is no need to comment further 
on this, except to point out that even this argument 
by plaintiff seems exactly contrary to the follow-
ing testimony by plaintiff elicited during cross ex-
amination: ( R. 70.) 
"Q. If the stock had only been worth 
ten cents a share and Mr. Morgan had put 
on a good act, that would have been all right 
with you? 
A. It probably would have because if 
Mr. Morgan actually had of insisted that I 
take this White Canyon stock, I would have no 
doubt have taken the money, would have in-
sisted on having the money. 
Q. You testified that he wanted to giYe 
you a check for the $2500.00 and you said-
A. He wanted to give me a check for 
$2500.00, that is correct. 
Q. So you were going to just wait for 
Mr. Morgan and were going to go the other 
way, is that right? 
A. In effect~ that 'vay, yes. 
Returning to the plaintiff's conte11tion that the 
defendants had the option of payi11g· the note when 
due, or, in lieu thereof, delivering the stock, \Ve are 
compelled to wonder where in the agT·een1ent there 
is any consideration g·ranting· defendants this right, 
or if defendants were accorded such an option, lvould 
not the parties have so stated in the agreement? 
12 
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The fact that there were options in the agree-
ment involving Coyote claims and White Canyon 
stock also completely discredits any such contention 
by plaintiff. Under option "C" the plaintiff, and 
only the plaintiff, can elect to take 2500 shares of 
White Canyon stock and forg·ive $1250.00 of the 
debt. Under option "B" the plaintiff, and only the 
plaintiff, could elect to cancel $1250.00 and accept 
instead 2 fi, interest in the Coyote District clain1s. 
The only logical result of plaintiff's argument is that 
options "B" and ''C" would have been eliminated 
if defendants had elected to discharge the $2500.00 
obligation by delivering the 7500 'shares of White 
Canyon stock which conceivably could have only 
been worth, at the time of delivery, ten cents a share. 
This wotlld seem to follow, since there would no 
longer have been any $2500.00 obligation against 
which the plaintiff could have chosen to cancel 
$1250.00 in exchange for Coyote claims (option 
"B") or White Canyon Mining Company stock ( op-
tion "C") . 
This, to the defendant's mind, points out rather 
vividly the compelled conclusion that the agreement 
is susceptible of only one reasonable interpretation. 
The agreement covers two subjects, one, a note 
which is secured by 7500 shares of stock, and the 
other subject refers to various stock options. It is 
a well accepted rule of law that in the interpre-
13 
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tation of written instruments the intent so expres-
sed is to be found, if possible, within the four cor-
ners of the instrument itself in accordance with 
the ordinary accepted meaning of the words used. 
(Ephraim Theatre Co. vs. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 
321 P. 2d 221.) 
The intent of a contract is to be ascertained 
from the four corners of the instrument itself, and 
if ambiguity can be reconciled from a reasonable 
interpretation of the instrument, extrinsic evidence 
should not be allowed. (Continental Bank and Trust 
Co. v. Bybee, 6 Utah 2d 98, 306 P. 2d 773). 
Here, as we have pointed out, to interpret this 
agreement as in reality granting the right to de-
fendants to pay the note at maturity or deliver the 
7500 shares, could result in rendering the language 
of options "B" and "C" useless and meaningless. 
As we have heretofore stated, the defendant is 
not particularly concerned as to the nature of the 
security. At 41 Am. J1tr. p. 584, it is stated: 
"The solution of the question whether a 
transaction shall be treated as having the 
characteristics of one form of security rather 
than the other often 1nust depe11d on the show-
ing as to the intention and conduct of the 
parties. This intention or conduct is ascer-
tained from ~he whole instrun1ent evidencing 
the transaction, and not from particular 
words therein. Thus, the fact that the word 
"pledge" is en1ployed in an instrun1ent e'ri-
dencing a transaction does not conclusively 
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determine its character, but the rule is that 
even where this word is used, if it appears 
that it is the clear intent of the parties that 
the possession of the subject matter is to re-
main in the debtor and the possession does 
so remain, the transaction may be held to 
be a mortgage." 
And later, at p. 585, it is stated: 
"Unless there is some evidence tendi11g 
to show an intention on the part of the debtor 
to give, and also on the part of the creditor to 
recieve, the property in satisfaction of the 
debt, either in whole or in part, the law pre-
sumes that it is given only as a collateral 
security. Especially does this presumption 
arise if the property give11 was itself a chose 
in action or a security of a different nature 
from the debt, whose value was neither in-
trinsic nor apparent, and was not agreed 
upon by the parties." 
This authority also cites with approval Casey 
v. Cavaroc, 96 US 467, 24 L. ed. 779 and Am. Law 
Inst. Restatement, Security, Sec. 10, as authority 
for the proposition that: 
"A contra'ct which is intended as a pledge 
of property is enforceable betvveen the par-
ties, although there has been no delivery of 
possession, provided there is a proper sub-
ject matter, a debt or engagement, and a 
meeting of the minds of tl1e parties that the 
subject matter shall be handed over to secure 
the payment or fulfillment of the debt or 
engagement." 
By any test of conduct of these parties as to 
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the 7500 shares of stock it is clear that a security 
' transaction was intended and created. The plaintiff 
said he would be willing to make a loan if a respon-
sible party would sign. He accepted Morgan a'S such 
a party and obtained his signature. The note and 
agreen1ent, Ex. P-1 and P-2, as pointed out, created 
a security transaction, and not as plaintiff contends, 
a l~ight to demand appropriation of 7500 shares of 
stock to satisfy the debt. The state of the oral testi-
n1ony by the parties leads to the ·same conclusion. 
POINT II. 
EVEN IF THE 7500 SHARES OF STOCK WERE 
NOT HELD AS SECURITY, PLAINTIFF MUST NEY"ER-
THELESS FAIL UNDER HIS THEORY, SINCE l\1:0R-
GAN ELECTED TO PAY THE NOTE RATHER THAN 
DELIVER THE SHARES. 
Although the defenda11t Morgan does not con-
cede the ill-founded theory of plaintiff to the 
effect that by the agreement defendants were given 
the option of either paying the note at maturity or 
delivering the stock, nevertheless, even under such 
a theory it would appear that plaintiff must fail; 
and this for the plain and obvious reason that if 
such an election resided in the defe11dant Morgan, 
he made the election to pay the note a11d 11ot deliYer 
the 7500 shares. ''Te have previously referred to 
ntnnerous instances in the record 'vhere Morgan 
tendered payment of the note and 'viii not acrain 
b 
detail these. 
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The trial court found that Morgan tendered 
payment of the note. There is ample evidence for 
such a finding, and indeed, no other finding could 
haYe been made in the light of the evidence. And, 
of course, it is elemental that the trial court's judg-
ment will not be disturbed on appeal unless there 
is insuficient evidence to support it, or unless there 
is a prejudicial error of law. 
In summation, the defendant submits that clear-
ly the 7500 shares vvere held as security; that if they 
were not so held, then even though plaintiff's theory 
is adopted, which would give defendants the option 
of paying the note or delivering the stock; never-
theless, the tender of payment by Morgan consti-
tuted an election on his part not to deliver the stock. 
And in neither event can there be any basis for an 
action of conversion. And if there was no conver-
sion, the damages claimed by plaintiff are, of course, 
immaterial. 
CROSS APPEAL 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT, 
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT 
THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION TO AC-
QUIRE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING 
CO::\IP ANY STOCK. 
17 
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POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT, 
AND CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT 
THAT DEFENDANT J. H. MORGAN, SR. WRONG-
]:4-,ULL Y REFUSED TO SELL 2500 SHARES OF WHITE 
CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK TO PLAINTIFF 
AT THE AGREED PRICE 'OF 80 CENTS A SHARE. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT, 
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT 
THAT PLAINTIFF IS REASONABLY ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS MATTER, AND THAT 
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IS A REASONABLE FEE 
THEREFOR. 
POINT IV. 
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE !~­
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT OF 
DAMAGE TO PLAINTIFF AS THE SAME RELATES 
TO THE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE CANYON ::\liN-
ING COMPANY STOCK. 
POINT V. 
THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE !~­
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE A'\TARD OF FIVE 
HUNDRED DOLLARS ATTORNEY'S FEES TO PLAIK-
TIFF. 
POINT VI. 
ASSUMING, ALTHOUGH DENIED BY THIS DE-
FENDANT, THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OP-
TION TO ACQUIRE THE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE 
CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK; E\~EN SO, THE 
JUDGMENT IS AGAINST LA\Y, IN THAT PLAIN-
TIFF, BY HIS INITIAL COMPLAINT, l\fADE AN EL-
ECTION OF REMEDIES AND SHOULD NOT BE PER-
lVIITTED TO DEPART FROM HIS ELECTION BY 
AMENDING THE COMPLAINT AND TRYING THE 
CASE ON A SUBSEQUENT THEORY OF CONVER-
SION. 
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POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT, 
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT 
THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OPTION TO AC-
QUIRE 2500 S·HARES OF WHITE CANYON MINING 
CO:JIPANY STOCK. 
An option is merely an offer which cannot be 
\vithdrawn for a spe·cified period of time. See Wil-
liston on Contracts, Section 61, and to be binding 
the offer must be accepted according to the terms 
of the offer \vithout imposing new conditions. Willis-
tau on Contracts, Sec. 73, Restatement of Contracts, 
Sec. 59 and 60. 
The above is so fundamental that no addition-
al authority need be cited. And thus we are left 
\vith the 'Sole question as to whether, bearing in 
mind that the burden was upon the plaintiff, has 
the plaintiff as a matter of fact proved, that he 
exercised the option according to its terms, and that 
the defendant Morgan refused to honor the terms 
of the option. For plaintiff to prevail there must 
have been an unqualified and unconditional exer-
cise of the option granted. And this would require 
the tender of $2000.00 by the plaintiff for 2500 
shares of White Canyon Mining Company stock. 
This tender to be effective, can in no way be quali-
fied or coupled with any other demand or condition, 
as for instance, demand for the 7500 share·s. 
The trial court found in paragraphs 4 and 5 of 
its findings of fact that plaintiff indicated his de-
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sire to exercise his option to the 2500 shares of 
stock in the White Canyon Mining Company by 
offering to defendant $2000.00 and that the defen-
dant Morgan refused to sell the 2500 shares to the 
plaintiff at the agreed price. Conclusions of law 
were accordingly made by the trial court. 
The only and ultimate question now presented 
is whether or not the findings of fact are contrary 
to the evidence. We submit the correct and true facts 
are; that the defendant Morgan did not sell the 
2500 shares to the plaintiff; that the defendant 
Morgan never refused to sell to the plaintiff 2500 
shares of stock according to the terms of the option; 
that any attempted exercise of the option by plain-
tiff was always coupled, qualified and conditioned 
upon defendant delivering, not only the 2500 shares, 
but also the 7500 shares of White Canyon Mining 
Company stock. 
There are three main sources in the record 
from which it can be determined 'vhether the op-
tion was exercised and properly or i1nproperly re-
fused. We will quote at lengtl1 from the record as 
to these three sources. 
First, the plaintiff could not hav·e atte1npted 
to exercise the option so far as the defendant Mor-
gan is concerned, until he first met Morga11 ,vhich 
was some four to ten days after the due date of the 
note. ( R. 46-4 7.) Plain tiff testified as to this first 
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and only meeting with the defendant Morgan as 
follows: 
"A. For this meeting we were on, yes, 
and I discussed this thing with Mr. Morgan 
that Espey had never paid the note and that 
he was very shocked; that seemingly appeared 
shocked that he hadn't paid it. He said, 'I can't 
understand why he hasn't paid it. He has 
paid the rest of them. I don't know why he 
missed yours.' As I recall this, Mr. Morgan 
got on the telephone and tried to find him at 
a tourist court or some such a thing. I don't 
even recall if he did find him. I don't believe 
he did but as I recall he did some of that. He 
said, 'Well, Mr. William's, I'll have to pay 
this note to you,' and he called his secretary 
in and said, 'Give Mr. Williams $2500.00 plus 
this 6lfr interest that he has coming to him.' 
I told Mr. Morgan that there was other things 
in the contract and that- that there was op-
tional stock - various stock options in it and 
too that the note had not been paid on time 
and that I would expect to get out of this con-
tract those things that I felt that I was en-
titled to. 
Q. Did you discuss particularly the 
Coyote interests that are mentioned on the 
first page of Exhibit I? 
A. Yes, Mr. Morgan pointed at that 
and told me that I could have that. As I re-
call, too, he said, 'It isn't any good but you 
can have it.' He said, 'I don't think it would 
be any good but you can have it.' 
So, I further explained that there was 
a couple of other options here that had to do 
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with White Canyon stock and he said, 'No,' 
he said, 'you're not about to get that.' 
THE COURT: I did not hear that. 
A. He said, 'No,' or words to the effect 
that, 'you are not about' - I think the word 
he u·sed, actually used was, "I'll see you in 
hell first on that one. You will not get it,' and 
I told him that I felt I was entitled to it and 
I would have to see an atorney. He told me, 
he said, 'It is usury.' I said 'I don't know about 
that.' Actually I didn't because I didn't know 
what usury was but I would have to see an 
attorney and decide. 
THE COURT: Now, that was as to 
what stock? 
THE WITNESS: That has reference, 
~our Honor, to the White Canyon stock, yes 
s1r. 
Q. (By Mr. Boyle) Did he make any 
reference as to what a Court might do if you 
went to Court? 
A. Well, the only reference he had to it, 
Mark, was that a Court would call it usury. 
I saw an attorney and-
Q. 
money? 
A. 
Q. 
sation? 
Excuse me, did you receive any 
No sir. 
And did that tern1inate the conver-
A. That terminated the conYersation. 
Additional testimony by the plaintiff concern-
ing the White Canyon Mining Company stock is to 
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be found at R. 66-67. This is the conversation plain-
tiff purportedly had with defendant Espey, the sub-
stance of which was never communicated or divulg-
ed to the defendant Morgan. 
On cross examination, R. 69-70, almost all of 
the testimony pertains to the 7500 shares of stock. 
At R. 83, the plaintiff testified: 
"Well, Mr. Morgan was very courteous, 
and very nice. He, as I before mentioned, of-
fered to pay this $2500.00 plus the interest, 
Then, when I talked about the other things 
in the contract that I felt that I was entitled 
to and got into it, of course, he was - he 
didn't mind about Coyote. He told me him-
self. I knew nothing about Coyote but as I 
recall he told me that Coyote was worth noth-
ing anyway but might be and you can have 
that but when we got to the White Canyon 
deal, that is when Mr. Morgan- he wanted 
to know- he wanted no part of that." 
Reading the above testimony, it is certainly 
clear that plaintiff on none of those occasions tend-
ered $2000.00 for 2500 shares of White Canyon 
Mining Company stock. It is true that he testified: 
"I told Mr. Morgan that there was other 
things in this contract and that- that there 
was optioned stock - various stock options 
in it and too that the note had not been paid 
on time and that I would expect to get out of 
this contract those things that I felt that I 
was entitled to." (R. 48) 
And later: 
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"So I further explained that there was 
a couple of other options here that had to do 
with White Canyon stock." (R. 48) 
And further at R. 83: 
"I knew nothing about Coyote but as I 
recall he told me that Coyote was worth noth-
ing anyway but might be and you can have 
that but when we got to the White Canyon 
deal that is when Mr. Morgan -he wanted 
to know- he wanted no part of that.'' 
And so as to all of these quoted statements, 
there is completely lacking any definite or positive 
assertion by plaintiff that he tendered $2,000.00 
for the 2500 shares of White Canyon stock. 
One thing certainly appears to be true and that 
is that when the plaintiff went to the defendant 
Morgan's office he didn't have the preconceived 
plan of exercising the option to acquire the 2500 
shares of White Canyon stock by paying 80 cents 
per share. This conclusion is arrived at ,, .. hen we 
consider the testimony of plaintiff on redirect, R. 
83: 
''Q. On cross examination you said 
it was Mr. Morgan's actions that made 
you think the White Canyon stock was valu-
able for the first tin1e. ''rill you tell the court 
just exactly what his actions ''""ere that led 
you to this belief?" 
The testimony of plaintiff on cross exan1ina-
tion at R. 69-70, \\Therein he stated that: 
" ... if Mr. Morgan actually had of in-
sisted that I take this White Canyon stock, 
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I would have no doubt have taken the money, 
would have insisted on having the money," 
also requires the conclusion that certainly during 
plaintiff's talk with Morgan he had no preconceived 
idea to exercise the option for the 2500 shares of 
\Y'hi te Canyon stock. 
Another illuminating factor of this transaction 
is that by option "C" plaintiff could have acquired 
2500 shares of White Canyon stock for 50 cents a 
share. It is utterly unreasonable and incomprehen-
sible that plaintiff would tender 80 cents a share 
for stock that he could have acquired for 50 cents 
a share. The plain fact of the matter is that, regard-
ing the testimony we have so far examined, plain-
tiff did not tender the 80 cents per 'share for the 
2500 shares of White Canyon stock, and thus from 
the first source, plaintiff's testimony, there is no 
evidence clearly indilcating that the option was ex-
ercised. 
The second source to which we can look in-
vol\·es an examination of Ex. P-5, which was the 
letter plaintiff's attorney wrote to the defendant 
on February 18, 1955, and from which we quote in 
part: 
"Demand is hereby made upon you for 
delivery of 7500 shares of White Canyon Min-
ing Company stock in lieu of payment of the 
above mentioned note and furthe1· demand is 
hereby made for an additional 2500 shares 
of White Canyon Mining Company stock at 
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the purchase price of 80¢ per sha~e, totaling 
$2000, which amount I am authorized to p~y 
you upon receipt of 10,000 shares of said 
stock." 
Now here the key phrase is, "which amount 
(and this can only mean the $2000.00) I am auth-
orized to pay you upon receipt of 10,000 shares of 
said stock." The letter containing the demand is 
clear and unequivocable, a tender of $2000.00 was 
made providing 10,000 shares were received. This 
was not an unqualified exercise of the option. It 
was conditional, the condition being delivery of 
10,000 sl1ares and not just the 2500 shares which 
were the subject of the option. 
The third source can be found in the testimony 
of the defendant Morgan at R. 95: 
"The conversation took place as Mr. '''il-
liams stated after I told him that I would 
pay the $2500.00 note and interest and then 
he said, 'What about the stock?'. \\re had the 
contract out at that time and he said he 
wanted the 7500 shares and the 2500 shares. 
The 2500 shares he was willing to pay the 
eighty cents a share if I would deliYer him 
the 10,000. He put it just about the same way 
as Mr. Boyle put it in his letter; that they 
wanted delivery of the 10,000 shares. I told 
him that I was holding the stocl\: as trustee 
for Mr. Espey; that if I should deliver him 
the 7500 shares, Mr. Espey could sue me be-
cause I was holding it in trust for hin1 · that 
the only thing I could do was to let hi~1 ex-
ercise his option if he wanted to on the 2500 
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shares at eighty cents. He didn't want to 
exercise his option on the 2500 shares unless 
I would deliver him the full 10,000 shares." 
It is submitted that a reading of the testimony 
of the plaintiff and defendant and examination of 
Ex. P-5 fails to show the plaintiff exercised the 
option for 2500 shares, and in fact compels the con-
clusion that the option was not exercised. If the 
option was not exercised, there can of course be 
no finding that Morgan wrongfully refused to sell 
the 2500 shares, and it follows that there is no basis 
to support the judgment of damage to the plaintiff 
as the same relates to the said shares. 
Points II and IV are primarily ·covered by the 
argument previously made and no further argu-
n1ent will be submitted as to these. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT, 
AND CONTRARY TO, THE FINDING OF THE COURT 
THAT PLAINTIFF IS REASONABLY ENTITLED TO 
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN THIS MATTER, AND THAT 
FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS IS A REASONABLE FEE 
THEREFOR. 
Defendant Morgan endorsed the promissory note 
for the accommodation of Espey, and, as he stated, 
he did not receive one cent from the loan. He is an 
acco1nmodation party under definition of the Law 
of Negotiable Instruments, 44-1-30, U.C.A., 1953, 
and \vas entitled to notice before he could be in de-
fault. 44-1-91, U.C.A., 1953. All of the evidence is; 
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that upon notice to defendant Morgan that the maker 
Espey had not paid the note on its maturity date, 
defendant promptly tendered principal and interest 
to the holder plaintiff. There is no evidence to the 
contrary. 
Having made a valid tender, and not being in 
default, defendant is not liable to pay attorney's 
fees for enforcement of the note nor for interest 
accruing after the tender. See 11 C.J.S. sec. 726 
P~age 27 4, holding: 
"There is no liability for attorney's fees 
when the amount due on the instrument has 
been tendered.'' (citing cases). 
47 C.J.S., INTEREST, sec 52, p. 63, 
''The valid tender of the amount of the 
principal debt prevents the running of inter-
est.'' (citing cases) 
Curiously, the trial court found that the de-
fendant Morgan had tendered payment of the note, 
but then inconsistently, it was also found that plain-
tiff was entitled to $500.00 attorney's fees. The 
award of attorney's fees can only be predicated 
upon the note, and if tender of payment was made 
upon demand, the award of attorney's fees cannot 
be supported. Point V relates to the same subject 
matter and is submitted without further argument. 
Both upon principle and authority the Lower 
Court's judgment awarding interest and attorney's 
fees on the note should be reversed, and the Lower 
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c~ourt should be directed to modify the judgment 
to allow principal and interest to the date of tender 
only. 
POINT VI. 
.:\SSUl\IING, ALTHOUGH DENIED BY THIS DE-
FENDANT, THAT PLAINTIFF EXERCISED THE OP-
TIO~ TO ACQUIRE THE 2500 SHARES OF WHITE 
CANYON MINING COMPANY STOCK; EVEN SO, THE 
JUDGMENT IS AGAINST LAW, IN THAT PLAIN-
TIFF, BY HIS INITIAL COMPLAINT, MADE AN EL-
ECTION OF REMEDIES AND SHOULD NOT BE PER-
1\IITTED TO DEPART FROM HIS ELECTION BY 
Al\IENDING T'HE COMP·LAINT AND TRYING THE 
CASE ON A SUBSEQUENT THEORY OF CONVER-
SION. 
Plaintiff by his original complaint, filed on or 
about March 18, 1955, demanded that defendants 
deliver title to 7500 shares and 2500 shares of White 
Canyon Mining Company stock. It is submitted that 
this action as initially filed, clearly amounts to an 
action in the nature of replevin. The plaintiff by his 
pleading made demand upon defendants for delivery 
of the stock and alleged refusal to deliver on the 
part of the defendants. The prayer of the complaint 
demanded transfer of title and delivery of the 7500 
and 2500 shares to plaintiff. Subsequently, the de-
fendants answered the complaint, and the matters 
were at issue. 
Thereafter, on January 11, 1957, almost two 
years later, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint. 
By this amended complaint, the theory of recovery 
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was drastically changed. The amended complaint, 
and the pleading upon which issues have been drawn 
now pertains to recovery on a theory of conversion. 
The answer of the defendant Morgan plead as a de-
fense the doctrine of election of remedies. 
That the plaintiff is now proceeding upon a 
theory of conversion is plainly evident from the 
amended complaint. Paragraph 8 states: 
"Defendants have converted said shares 
of stock to their own use and benefit." 
And again at paragraph 11 it is plainly evi-
dent that the theory is now conversion. It is of course 
not even remotely possible that the plaintiff would 
dispute the nature of the amended complaint in view 
of the brief filed on his behalf. 
And so it is submitted that this is exactly the 
type of situation to which the doctrine of election 
of reme'dies applies. As is generally stated in 18 
Am. Jur. at page 129: 
"DEFINITION AND NATURE. - El-
Pction is simply what the term imports - a 
choice shown by an overt act between two or 
more inconsistent rights, either of which may 
be asserted at the will of the chooser alone. 
An election of remedies may be defined as the 
choosing between two or more different and 
coexisting modes of procedure and relief al-
lowed by law on the same state of facts. The 
doctrine is applicable where an aggrieved 
party has two remedies by which he may en-
force inconsistent rights growing out of the 
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same transaction and, being cognizant of his 
legal rights and of such facts as will enable 
him to make an intelligent choice, brings his 
action by one of the methods. Under such 
circumstances, the law says he shall not there-
after adopt the alternate remedy, for a suitor 
cannot purstle a remedy which predicates his 
case upon one theory of right and thereafter 
seek a remedy inconsistent with such prior 
proceeding. If he has voluntarily chosen and 
carried into effect an appropriate remedy 
wjth knowledge of the facts and his rights, he 
will not, in general, be allowed to resort after-
ward to an inconsistent remedy, which would 
involve a contradiction of the grounds upon 
which he before proceeded." 
As stated in 89 C.J.S., page 55'3: 
"Trover is the technical name of the ac-
tion to recover damages for a wrongful con-
version of the personal property of another." 
We now have a situation in this litigation where 
plaintiff instituted an action of replevin, indeed 
plaintiff termed the initial complaint, as being one 
for specific performance ( R. 6) and then subse-
quently, over objection of defendant Morgan, amend-
ed to plead and thereafter try the case upon a theory 
of trover, or, as is more commonly known, conver-
. 
Sl0l1. 
The doctrine of election of remedies is applic-
able where remedies of replevin and trover are con-
cerned. In the case of Equitable Trust Company vs. 
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Connecticut Brass and Manufacturing Corporation, 
C.C.A. 2, 290 F. 712, it is stated at page 725: 
"All actions which proceed upon the 
theory that title to the property is in the claim-
ant are substantially inconsistent with those 
which proceed upon the theory that title is 
in the defendant. Thus the remedies of rep-
levin and trover are inconsistent. In one of 
them the plaintiff affirms his ownership of 
and title to the property seized; in the other 
he disaffirms his ownership and title and 
sues for the conversion. If a plaintiff elects 
to resort to one of these remedies, he thereby 
deprives himself of any right to resort to the 
other." 
The above case was cited with approval in Todd 
vs. Duncklee, 94 N.H. 226, 52 Atl. 2d 285. The Ten-
nessee case, Johnston vs. Cincinnati, N.O. and TPR 
Company, 146 Tenn. 135, 240 S.W. 428, states 
at page 438: 
"It is therefore manifest that, if the facts 
would have sustained a claim of conversion, 
which is not necessary to decide, complainant 
in his bill elected to waive that claim by alleg-
ing his own ownership of the property, and 
asking for its return and for rental or hire 
f •t " or 1 s use ... 
In Saner vs. Whiteman Lumber Company vs. 
Texas and N.O.R. -Co., Texas, 288 S.W. 127, the 
court at page 128 stated: 
"The court of appeals has correctly held 
that the lessor of these rails had a choice of 
remedies. It could recover the rails, or pro-
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pPrty itself as per the terms of the contract, 
or it could recover their value because of the 
convet·sion. But the two remedies are clearly 
inconsistent. Both cannot be pursued. One 
cannot recover the rails and also their value. 
It was necessary to make an election, and les-
sor made it. Having made this election, it 
must abide by it." 
There can no longer be any question in Utah 
as to when the election is conclusive. Howard vs. 
Paulson Co., 41 Ut. 490, 127 Pac. 284 held that 
where there was a duty of election as to a particular 
remedy, the bringing of an action based upon one 
remedy constitutes an irrevocable election in the 
absence of mistake of fact or other legal excuse. 
The fairness involved in the election of reme-
dies doctrine is brought into sharp focus in this 
case. For a period of some 2'2 months the plaintiff 
pleaded and relied upon replevin, that is to say he 
\Vas seeking the return of the stock. In effect, dur-
ing this period the plaintiff played the market, and 
when the value of White Canyon stock substantially 
decreased, see Ex. P-4, he determined to amend his 
pleading and proceed on another and inconsistent 
theory, namely, trover and conversion. 
The defendant J. H. Morgan, Sr. submits with-
out a~he previously designated defense of 
usury. 
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CONCLUSION 
In summation, defendant J. H. Morgan, Sr. 
submits the following: 
The 7500 shares of White Canyon Mining Com-
pany stock were held as security, and the decision 
of the trial court 1nust be affirmed. If not so held, 
then even under plaintiff's theory the defendant 
elected the pay the note rather than deliver the stock. 
The trial court's decision as to the 2500 shares 
must be reversed for the reason that plaintiff never 
exercised the option to purchase such shares, or if 
the option was exercised, plaintiff by his initial 
complaint made an irrevocable election to sue in 
replevin and thus was precluded from thereafter 
amending and proceeding in trover and conversion. 
The trial court's award of $500.00 attorney's 
fees is clearly in error and must be reversed, since 
defendant tendered payment of the note. 
The lower court should be directed to modify 
the judgment so as to award interest to the date of 
tender only. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MULLINER, PRINCE 
and MANGUM 
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